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TOWARDS A UNIFIED BELIEF STRUCTURE IN GAMES WITH
INDETERMINATE PROBABILITIES
YANG LIU
ABSTRACT. This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of
beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different
structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention
is also paid to the decision-theoretic principle known as the thesis of no subjective
probability for self-action. Conditions in cope with this principle are given which
underlie the interrelationships between different models of beliefs, and it is shown
that under these conditions different doxastic structures can be coherently unified.
1. INTRODUCTION
The epistemic approach to non-cooperative game theory places in the center
the analyses of epistemic mutual expectations of different parties of a game, where
the players’ choices of the best courses of action are determined not only by their
beliefs about the structure of the game (including players, actions, payoffs, and
preferences) but also by their beliefs of the beliefs of the other players, and so on.
A mathematical model that emphasizes the epistemic dimension of a game hence
needs to incorporate, as a constituent component of the model, a systematic repre-
sentation of players’ beliefs. Two main types of formal representation are widely
adopted in the philosophical literature, namely, the Kripke doxastic structure K
and the Bayesian probabilistic structure P . Both structures are constructed on a
possible-world framework where a player’s belief expresses certain attitudes to-
wards a given proposition (or an event, in the probabilistic case) which is further
characterized as a set of doxastic possibilities. In a game-theoretic setting, each
possibility corresponds to a complete description of an alternative way the game
may evolve, and it is customary in game theory that players’ propositional atti-
tudes be subject to informational analysis using information structures I , where
different representations of beliefs are seen as different measures of information
distributions among the players. Another type of doxastic representation that has
a distinctive place in game-theoretic analyses is the use of various Harsanyi type
structures T . Depending on the particular modeling, a type structure is a proba-
bility function that measures a player’s uncertainties about other players’ actions
(or/and payoffs, beliefs, etc.), which is considered as an integral part of overall
doxastic assessments of the player.
Key words and phrases. representing beliefs, indeterminate probabilities, Bayesianism, blindspot,
sure-thing principle, ambiguity.
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One of the main aims of the present paper is to provide a synthesis of the afore-
mentioned belief structures (K, I ,P , T ). Numerous discussions on different repre-
sentations of beliefs in games and their interrelationships are readily available in,
for instance, Battigalli and Bonanno (1999), Halpern (2003), Brandenburger (2007).
The current presentation is distinctive in that, in all Bayesian frameworks dis-
cussed below, it is taken as a fundamental assumption that the players’ beliefs
be measured by indeterminate probabilities (sets of subjective probabilities) in-
stead of sharp/determinate ones, an approachmotivated by the philosophical the-
sis that the agent’s credal state shall be represented by indeterminate credences.
The literature on indeterminate probabilities is vast, see, for instance, Levi (1974),
Walley (1991), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Seidenfeld et al. (1995). In this
paper, we do not engage in the philosophical debate on whether or not rational
agents always have sharp (subjective) probabilities, rather, it is taken for granted
that players’ credal states be represented by sets of probabilities. Focus is however
placed on investigating as to how different belief structures fit in to one another
with the idea of indeterminate probabilities in sight.
One concept that plays an important role in the discussions of belief structures
below is that of doxastic blindspots. Roughly speaking, in a possible-world frame-
work equipped with accessibility relations, a doxastic blindspot is taken to be a
state/world that is not considered by the decision maker as doxastically possible.
We show, through the analysis of the impossibility theorem of Aumann (1976),
that the uniformity of doxastic blindspots among the players in a group is the key
to the convergence of group opinion, which, however, is presumably a very strong
assumption on the part of players. In discussing Bayesian probabilistic models for
games, special attention are also given to the decision-theoretic principle known
as the thesis of no probability for self-action defended by Savage (1972), Spohn (1977),
Levi (1989, 1996), Gaifman (1999), Liu (2013) among others. That is,
no subjective/personal probabilities should be assigned by the
players to their own future actions.
This principle, as we shall discuss in greater detail in Section 5, posits a challenge
to the epistemic configurations of many of the existing game-theoretic models. In
coping with this principle we make clear distinction, in the interpretation of the
formalism developed below, between probability assignments assigned globally
to state-descriptions of a given game situation (a third-person perspective) and
those assignments that characterize players’ first-person subjective assessments of
the unfolding of the underlying game.
The plan of the paper is as follows: since information takes the center stage
in game-theoretic analyses, we first present an extended discussion on informa-
tion structures and its relation to Kripke structures, where a purely information-
theoretic version of Aumann’s (1976) impossibility theorem is proved. The proof
relies on the notion of doxastic blindspots and a generalized Savage’s sure-thing
principle (GSTP) which will be made clear shortly. This will be followed by the
introduction of different representations of beliefs widely adopted in the game-
theoretic literature. Conditions (A1, A2, B1, C1, and C2) are given in the attempt
to correlate different belief structures with one another, and it is shown that under
these conditions there is a sense in which the belief structures can be coherently
unified in epistemic games. Some conceptual issues concerning the asymmetry of
epistemic viewpoints in existing game-theoretic models are discussed in Section 5.
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2. INFORMATION STRUCTURE
2.1. Kripke Structure. Let Ω be a (finite) set which is referred to as the state space.
A Kripke model over Ω is a relational structure which is distinguished with a
binary relation ❀ ⊆ Ω × Ω. In a Kripke model of beliefs, ❀ is referred to as a
doxastic accessibility relation among possible states. Intuitively, ω ❀i ω′ says that,
from the perspective of player i, ω′ is considered doxastically possible in state ω.
We also say that ω′ is❀i-accessible from ω. The following is a list of properties of
❀ that are commonly adopted in a doxastic model: for any ω,ω′,ω′′ ∈ Ω,
Seriality: for each ω there exists an ω′ such that ω ❀ ω′.
Transitivity: if ω ❀ ω′′and ω′′ ❀ ω′ then ω ❀ ω′.
Euclid: if ω ❀ ω′ and ω ❀ ω′′ then ω′ ❀ ω′′.
2.2. Information structures. Define function I i : Ω → 2Ω by
I i(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | ω ❀i ω′}. (A1)
Then I i(ω) is the set of states that are❀i-accessible from ω, call I i(ω) the infor-
mation set of i in state ω, the intended interpretation is that I i(ω) contains all the
relevant information that can be accessed by i at ω. Player i is said to be informed of
certain event E (a set of states) in state ω if I i(ω) ⊆ E (i.e., if the information i pos-
sesses at ω is contained in E). For any E ⊆ Ω, denote by I i(E) the set of all states
that are❀i-accessible from the states in E, i.e., I i(E) =
⋃
ω∈E I
i(ω). Further, let
I i = {I i(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} (1)
be the information structure of player i. Hence I i provides a full description of what
information player i has in each state.1
Alternatively, one can take the information function I i : Ω → 2Ω of player i as
primitive and define i’s accessibility relation❀i over Ω by
❀
i:=
{
(ω,ω′) ∈ Ω× Ω | ω′ ∈ I i(ω)
}
. (A2)
Consider the following properties of an information structure I : for any ω ∈ Ω,
Viability: I(ω) 6= ∅.
Inclusion: if ω′ ∈ I(ω) then I(ω′) ⊆ I(ω).
Mutuality: if ω′,ω′′ ∈ I(ω) then ω′′ ∈ I(ω′) and ω′ ∈ I(ω′′).
The following theorem establishes a basic relation between properties of doxastic
Kripke models and that of information structures, the proof is immediate from
(A1) and (A2), and hence omitted.
Theorem 1. Let I be an information structure and❀ be the corresponding acces-
sibility relation then,
(1) ❀ is serial if and only if I is viable;
(2) ❀ is transitive if and only if I is inclusive;
(3) ❀ is Euclidean if and only if I is mutual.
Definition 2. An information structure I is said to be divisible if it is (a) viable, (b)
inclusive, and (c) mutual; I is partitional if it is divisible and I(Ω) = Ω.
1Here we introduce a systematic ambiguity using I i to denote the information structure of player i and
using I i(·) to denote the information function of i. There shall be no danger of confusion: I i(ω) is the
information set of player i at ω, which is also an element of I i.
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Proposition 3. If I is divisible then, for any ω,ω′ ∈ Ω, either I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) = ∅
or I(ω) = I(ω′).
It is easy to see that if I is divisible then, by Theorem 1, the corresponding
accessibility relation❀ forms an equivalence relation over Ω, in this case we have
that I(ω) = [ω]❀ for all ω ∈ Ω.
2.3. Doxastic blindspot. The discussion above enables a classification of states in
Ω. Note that if I(Ω) is a proper subset of Ω then it follows that there are some
states that do not fall in any information set, or equivalently, they are not ❀i-
accessible for i from any state in Ω. We refer to such states as player i’s doxastic
blindspots. For instance, in Figure 1, let Ω = {ω1,ω2} and I
i(ω1) = I
i(ω2) =
{ω2}, then ω1 is a doxastic blindspot for i.
2
ω1 // ω2

FIGURE 1. State ω1 is a blindspot for player i.
Definition 4. For any ω ∈ Ω, ω is said to be a doxastic blindspot (or blindspot for
short) of player i if there is no ν ∈ Ω such that ω ∈ I i(ν). The set of all blindspots
of i is denoted by Bi(Ω).
Proposition 5. I i(Ω) ∩ Bi(Ω) = ∅ and I i(Ω) ∪ Bi(Ω) = Ω.
Proposition 6. Suppose that, for any i, j ∈ N, the information structures I i and I j
are divisible, then
(1) ω /∈ I i(ω) if and only if ω ∈ Bi(Ω);
(2) if ν ∈ I i(ω) then ν ∈ I i(ν) = I i(ω);
(3) if I i(Ω) = I j(Ω) then, for any ν ∈ I i(Ω), ν ∈ I j(ν).
It shall be pointed out that the existence of blindspots differentiates a doxas-
tic information model from an epistemic one, the latter is widely used in repre-
senting knowledge where it is assumed that ω ∈ I i(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, that is,
it is assumed that it is impossible that the players’ information sets exclude “the
true state of the world” (and hence there is no blindspot). The assumption is of-
ten referred to as the “truth condition” of information sets which echoes the sub-
stantive assumption that knowledge is infallible. Many interesting results in the
game-theoretic literature hinge on this conditions (for instance, Aumann (1976),
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Parikh and Krasucki (1990), Aumann (1995),
Aumann (1998)). The assumption however is not uncontroversial, especiallywhen
observing from the agent’s point of view, it is unclear as to how the existence of
blindspots can be eliminated by stipulating that player’s information be always
truthful. In the next two sections, we provide a purely information-theoretic anal-
ysis of Aumann (1976), we discuss a scenario under which a variant of Aumann’s
impossibility theorem still holds under weakened conditions. The analysis relies
on (1) a notion of common information, which is analogous to the concept of com-
mon knowledge (or common beliefs), and (2) a generalized Savage’s sure-thing
principle.
2Our concept of doxastic blindspot is altered from Collins, who in turn introduced the term from
Sorensen (1988). The analysis here is a continuation of Collins.
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2.4. Common information. In the interactive situation, let ❀N be the smallest
transitive set that contains all the❀i’s, that is,
❀
N := TC
( ⋃
i∈N
❀
i
)
, (2)
where ‘TC’ stands for the transitive closure operator. Then, relation❀N represents
the maximum reachability of all❀i’s (cf. Lemma 8(1) below). Call❀N the group
accessibility relation of N. For any (ω,ω′) ∈❀N, we also say that ω′ is❀N-accessible
from ω. From the group accessibility relation❀N a corresponding notion of group
information function IN : Ω → 2Ω can be defined by
IN(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | ω ❀N ω′}. (3)
And let IN be the group information structure such that3
IN = {IN(ω) | ω ∈ Ω}. (4)
Definition 7. Let E be any event, say that E is common information amongmembers
of group N at ω, if IN(ω) ⊆ E.
The following lemma exemplifies some basic properties of the group accessibil-
ity relation❀N and the group information structure IN .
Proposition 8. Let I i,❀N , and IN be defined as above, then the following hold
(1) For any (ω,ω′) ∈❀N, there corresponds a sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ N and
a sequence of states ω0,ω1, . . . ,ωk ∈ {ν | ω ❀
N ν} with ω0 = ω and
ωk = ω
′ such that ω0 ❀
i1 ω1 ❀
i2 · · ·❀ik ωk, where 0 ≤ k < ∞.
(2) For any ω ∈ Ω we have
I i(ω) ⊆ IN(ω).
(3) For any ω ∈ Ω and for any i ∈ N, we have
I i
(
IN(ω)
)
⊆ IN(ω).
(4) Given any ω ∈ Ω, if, for any i, j ∈ N, I i and I j are divisible and I i(Ω) =
I j(Ω), then
IN(ω) = I i
(
IN(ω)
)
.
2.5. Agreeing to disagree. Savage proposed his “sure-thing principle” (STP) as
one of the basic postulates in his theory of decision making under uncertainty (P2
in Savage, 1972, p.23). The principle is derived from, what he calls, a “loose” ver-
sion of STP which says that if a decision maker will take certain action conditional
on the occurrence of some event and she will take the same action if the event does
not occur, then she shall take the action without taking into account the occurrence
of that event. This “loose” version of STP captures an intuitive idea of reasoning
by cases, which is considered by Savage as a general principle for rational decision
3We can also take players’ information structures I i, . . . , In as primitive and define group information
structure IN as the meet of the I is, i.e., IN =
∧
i∈N I
i, and hence the group accessibility relation❀N
can be defined by
❀
N := {(ω,ω′) ∈ Ω×Ω | ω′ ∈ IN(ω)}. (2’)
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making, “I,” he continues, “know of no other extralogical principle governing de-
cisions that finds such ready acceptance.” In the light of this principle of rationality
we propose the following generalization of STP:
Generalized Sure-Thing Principle: If a decision maker makes the same de-
cision in all possible situations based on the information she holds in each
situation, then the decision maker shall decide on that decision without
differentiating the information that leads to the decision.
Formally, let D be a nonempty set with unspecified domain, call f : 2Ω → D an
informational decision function for i if for any S ⊆ Ω the following condition holds:
f
(
I i(ν)
)
= d for all ν ∈ S =⇒ f
( ⋃
ν∈S
I i(ν)
)
= d, (GSTP)
where f
(
I i(ν)
)
= d is a decision made by player i in state ν based on her informa-
tion set I i(ν), and S is a set of possible situations. Then (GSTP) says that if player
i makes the same decision d in all possible situations (states) in S then she should
decide on d without differentiating the information generated in S (i.e., I i(ν)’s
where ν ∈ S). We may now prove the following:
Theorem 9. Let Ω,N, I i be defined as above and ω be the actual state of theworld.
Suppose that, for any i, j ∈ N,
(1) I i, I j are divisible,
(2) Bi(Ω) = B j(Ω);
(3) f is an informational decision function for i; and
(4) i’s decision di is common information shared among members of N at ω.
Then, di = dj for all i, j ∈ N.
If f is intended to be a conditional probability of some event A (i.e., if f (·) =
Pr(A | ·)) and I i(Ω) = Ω (and hence Bi(Ω) = ∅ by Proposition 5), then we have
the impossibility result of Aumann (1976) as a special case of Theorem 9.
The theorem proved here is more general in that there is no reference to the
notion of knowledge or that of beliefs. This has a conceptual advantage: the proof
exemplifies the reasoning behind the agreeing-to-disagree type of argumentwhich
essentially rests on the structures of information distributions among a group,
which can be analyzed from a detached viewpoint without having to ask those
puzzling questions like how the common knowledge of prior and posterior prob-
abilities is arrived at. Moreover, unlike Aumann’s knowledge model, we do not
excluded the situations that admit doxastic blindspots, which extends the impos-
sibility theorem to a more general setting.
However, as seen in the theorem, in order to have the convergence of group
opinions it is necessary that all the players in N have the same doxastic blindspots.4
Counterexamples can be easily sought if this requirement is dropped. But this is a
very strong assumption on the part of players in a group, where the players may
enter the decision situation from different angles and hence have different infor-
mation. Therefore, in general it is possible for the players to agree to disagree.5
4Aumann’s original proof uses a knowledge model which is provably equivalent to a S5 system in
modal logic. As a consequence, it is assumed implicitly that there is no blindspot for any of the players
in his model.
5For further discussion on this point see Collins.
TOWARDS A UNIFIED BELIEF STRUCTURE IN GAMES WITH INDETERMINATE PROBABILITIES 7
3. MODELS OF BELIEFS
3.1. Belief operator. In a standard information model, to say that player i believes
certain event E, in symbols BiE, is for the player to have the information about
E. Given the characterization of the information structure of player i above, we
say that player i believes certain event E in state ω if I i(ω) ⊆ E. Formally, a belief
operator B is a set-valued function on 2Ω satisfying
BE = {ω ∈ Ω | I(ω) ⊆ E}; (5)
or, equivalently, by (A1),
BE = {ω ∈ Ω | for any ν ∈ Ω, ω ❀ ν implies ν ∈ E}. (6)
The following is a list of properties of a belief operator B: for any E, F ⊆ Ω,
N: BΩ = Ω
K: B(E ∪ F) ∩ B¬E ⊆ BF
D: BE ⊆ ¬B¬E
4: BE ⊆ BBE
5: ¬BE ⊆ B¬BE
where ¬E stand for Ω − E. The labels of the above properties echo the names of
the corresponding inference rule of necessitation and the axioms in modal logic.
Theorem 10. Let B be a belief operator defined above, then B satisfies N and K.
Theorem 11. Let B be a belief operator as defined in (5), then
(1) B satisfiesD if and only if the underlying information structure I is viable;
(2) B satisfies 4 if and only if I is inclusive;
(3) B satisfies 5 if and only if I is mutual.
In the light of Proposition 1 and Proposition 11, let us summarize the relations
between the properties of a belief operator B and that of its corresponding defining
information structure I (5) and doxastic accessibility relation❀ (6) in Table 1.
TABLE 1.
B ❀ I
D serial viable
4 transitive inclusive
5 Euclidean mutual
3.2. Degrees of Belief. In defining a belief operator (5), an event E is said to be
believed by player i if the information i possesses in state ω is completely included
in E. Now let us consider the case where the inclusion is not complete, that is, the
information i has at ω is only partially contained in E. In this case, the player is
uncertain about the occurrence of E. What we need is a more fine-grained mea-
sure of beliefs. This is usually fulfilled by using probability measures to represent
players’s partial beliefs. To be more precise, let Ω be a state space and F be an
algebra over Ω. Let player’s credal states be represented by a set P i of probability
functions on F (indeterminate probabilities). We refer to P i as the global probabil-
ity assignments of player i. This concept corresponds to players’ prior probability
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assessments in the game-theoretic literature. We however refrain from using this
nomenclature for the reasons to be discussed shortly in Section 5.
Presumably, in a given state space Ω, the doxastic accessibility relation ❀i
amongmembers of Ω and the probability functions inP i over Ω are differentmea-
sures of the same epistemic capability of player i, namely i’s belief structure. There
shall be some compatibility requirements that relate these two different modes of
modeling. Recall that Bi(Ω) stands for the set of blindspots of i in Ω. That is to say,
for any ω ∈ Bi(Ω), the existence of ω in Ω is postulated by i as a mere logical pos-
sibility to which the player has no epistemic access. It is then conceivable that, in
the corresponding probabilistic model of beliefs where epistemic possibilities are
measured by some probability functions, a doxastic blindspot be assigned with
zero probability. Hence we have the following consistency requirement imposed
on i’s information structure and priors that,6
ω ∈ Bi(Ω) if and only if ρi(ω) = 0, for all ρi ∈ P i. (B1)
In other words, ω is a doxastic blindspot for i if and only if all the priors of i assign
probability 0 to ω.7
By Proposition 5, (B1) implies that, for any ω ∈ I i(Ω), ρi(ω) = 0 for all ρi ∈ P i,
that is, ω is ❀i-accessible from some state if and only if ρi(ω) > 0 for all ρi ∈
P i. Condition (B1) characterizes a global relationship between P i and I i(Ω) (or
Bi(Ω)); the next question is, at the local level, what is the relationship between P i
and each I i(ω), ω ∈ Ω. We discuss this in the context of epistemic games.
4. BELIEFS IN EPISTEMIC GAME
4.1. Epistemic extension. In this paper, we consider models for games in strategic
form augmented by type structure. Formally, let Γ = 〈N, {Ai}, {ui}〉 be a (finite)
strategic game, where N is a finite group of players and, for each player i ∈ N, Ai
is a nonempty set of actions from which player i choose to act. Let A = ∏i∈N A
i
be the product space of all action spaces, each member of which forms an action
profile, that is, for any a ∈ A, a = (a1, . . . , an) where ai ∈ A
i. We refer to a real
function ui : A → R as the payoff function of i. The interpretation is that if the
players in N adopt respectively the actions described in the profile a ∈ A then
ui(a) is the payoff (or the outcome) for i. Following the convention in game theory,
we often write an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A as (a
i, a−i) where ai is the
ith coordinate of a, denoted also by (a)i, i.e., the action adopted by player i in a,
and a−i is the action profile of a of the players other than i. Write A−i for ∏j 6=i A
j,
hence, for any a ∈ A, we have ai ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i.
Further, let Ti = ∆(A−i) denote the set of the probability measures defined on
A−i. We refer to a member ti of Ti as a type of player i, which characterizes i’s belief
about the other players’ behavior.8 Let T = ∏i∈N T
i be the type space of N, and
6For notational convenience, write ρi(ω) for ρi
(
{ω}
)
.
7To avoid the complications from regularity (cf. Ha´jek (2013) and Spohn (2012)), throughout this paper
it is assumed that |Ω| < ∞ and F = 2Ω.
8The current definition of types is altered from Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) which in turn is
inspired by Harsanyi (1968) types in describing games with incomplete information, see Perea. The
difference is that we do not include in the present model an explicit representation of a hierarchy
of beliefs (cf. Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)); what we call types conrresponds to the concept of
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hence, for any t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T , t provides a type profile of group N. Similarly,
write T−i for ∏j 6=i T
j, then, for any t = (ti, t−i) ∈ T , ti ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i. .
Definition 12. An epistemic extension of strategic game Γ is a structure of the form
Γ′ = 〈N, {Ai}, {ui}, {Ti}〉.
4.2. Belief structures in epistemic games. Let Ω = A× T , then, for each ω ∈ Ω,
ω is in the form of
ω = (a, t) = (ai, a−i; ti, t−i), (7)
We refer to each ω as a state-description of the given game situation which includes
a profile of actions and a profile of types of all players. For notational purpose, we
use Ja−iK to denote the set of all states in Ω that contain a−i, i.e.,
Ja−iK =
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣ ω = (bi, b−i; si, s−i) and b−i = a−i
}
. (8)
Similarly, JtiK is the set of states that contain ti.
Now we return to the discussion of the relationship between different belief
structures in Ω. As before, let P i be the set of probability functions over Ω that
represents player i’s beliefs. We take that player i’s types shall not be inconsistent
with the probabilistic judgements assessed globally, that is, for any ti ∈ Ti and for
any a−i ∈ A−i, there is some ρi ∈ P i such that,
ti(a−i) = ρi
(
Ja−iK
)
. (C1)
Further, to relate to player i’s doxastic accessibility relation ❀i in Ω, define that,
for any ω = (ai, a−i; ti, t−i) and ω′ = (bi, b−i; si, s−i),
ω ❀i ω′ if and only if ti
(
b−i
)
> 0. (C2)
That is to say, state ω′ is considered by player i as a doxastic possibility in state ω
if i assigns a non-zero probability to b−i contained in ω′.
Theorem 13. Given (B1) and (C1), the accessibility relation❀i (i ∈ N) defined in
(C2) is (1) serial, (2) transitive, and (3) Euclidean.
The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem 1, Theorem 11 and
Theorem 13 (cf. Table 1).
Corollary 14. For any i ∈ N, let I i and Bi be defined in terms of❀i in (C2), then
each I i is divisible and Bi satisfies KD45.
It is shown that given the unifying conditions discussed thus far, different belief
structures can be pieced together in terms of inter-definability in the context of
epistemic game theory with rounded properties that are commonly attributed to a
full belief structure in logic.
conjecture in Aumann and Brandenburger’s terminology which is considered in the present paper as
a constitutive aspect of i’s belief. In principle, there is a degree of freedom in generating types. The
current definition of types can be easily extended to include other players’ types. To be more precise, a
type of player i can be defined as a probability function on A−i × T−i. The only restricting requirement
that is emphasized in the current paper is not to define type on the players’ own actions. And it it is
not difficult to see that Theorem 13 and Corollary 14 below still hold under modified types.
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5. DISCUSSION
5.1. Global and local probabilistic assessments. Figure 2 is an illustration of the
interrelationships between different aspects of the belief structure in epistemic
games under the unifying conditions A1, A2, B1, C1, and C2. As seen, what links
the Kripke structure and the probabilistic structure in the epistemic approach to
games is the concept of types (C2). In this paper, the types T are taken to be de-
cision makers’ local probabilistic assessments of other players’ behavior, which in
turn is considered as a constituent part of the global probabilistic assessments P .
Condition C1 is a consistency constrain that relates these two levels of probabilis-
tic assessments. Further, it is worth pointing out that local probabilities provide
also a refined measurement of doxastic accessibility. That is, by condition C2, we
can now say that ω′ is❀i-accessible from ω to degree c if ti(b−i) = c. This accords
well with the intuition that some states are “more”❀i-accessible than others.
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FIGURE 2. Unifying belief structures in epistemic games
Let us now return to the discussion of the interpretations of these different lev-
els of probabilistic assignments. The global probability assignments P i are often
referred to as prior probabilistic judgments of player i (for models with determinate
probability replace P i with a single probability function, the conceptual problems
raised below apply to both determinate and indeterminate priors), which are prob-
ability measures defined on the state space Ω. Note that, in the context epistemic
game theory, each state-description includes a profile of actions of all players, see
(7), hence each probability function ρ ∈ P i assigns indirectly a probability to ac-
tion of each player including i herself. However, we point out that the assumption
of P i being the priors of player i is conceptually untenable.9
5.2. Probability and Act. The thesis that directly undermines attributing global
probability assignments to players as their own priors is this: “Any adequate
quantitative decision model must not explicitly or implicitly contain any subjec-
tive probabilities for acts”.10 In games, the principle says that no subjective proba-
bilities could be assigned by the players to their own future actions in a meaningful way,
and hence P i cannot be a set of priors of i obtained from the outset.
This doctrine of so-called “no probability for self-action” is hinted in Savage’s
discussion on the “small world” semantics where he mentioned in passing that
9The discussion in 5.2 is in part modified from Section 3 in Liu (2013).
10Here we quote the version that is explicitly stated in Spohn (1977). Levi’s well-known thesis that
“deliberation crows out prediction” is largely in agreement with this principle, see Levi (1996).
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probabilities for acts play no role in individual decision making (Savage, 1972,
pp.82-84). To illustrate, let us use the example Savage provided. Suppose that
Jones is torn between either (i) buying a sedan, or (ii) buying a convertible, or (iii)
canceling altogether the plan of purchase and keeping the money. It is conceiv-
able that, in a simple decision situation, the execution of an action may be solely
determined by the relative ranking of the consequences to which the actions lead.
That is to say, if Jones prefers the convertible the most, then he shall just proceed to
buy a convertible. “Chance and uncertainty are considered to have nothing to do
with the situation.” One might object by suggesting that if Jones likes, say, equally
the sedan, he might come to make a decision on his future action of purchasing
either a convertible or a sedan by tossing a coin or by utilizing some internal ran-
domizing mechanism (whim, impulse, etc.) to help him decide, then in this case
there seems to be a sense in which one could say that Jones will take an action with
such-and-such probability. However the formulation of the objection itself make it
plain that the derived probability is essentially about the randomizer in use, which
can hardly qualify for the agent’s genuine subjective probability assignment.
In a more complicated situation where more careful deliberation is required,
the agent’s actions are further evaluated in terms of their respective consequences
under different circumstances, and, according to Savage, only the latter are subject
to probabilistic evaluations. Say that Jones has finally reached a decision to buy a
convertible because he realized that it’s very likely that he will be taking a vacation
in Monterey next month, in which case the utility of driving a convertible by the
seaside in warm spring breeze will be maximally materialized. Hence, as seen in
both situations, the choices of actions are never deliberated by a decision maker in
isolation, they are always placed in a context in which they are to be evaluated, and
the context itself will provide the relevant details (including the circumstances in
which an act may take place and the consequences it results in) under which the
values of acts are measured and decided. These considerations led Savage to his
belief-act-consequencemodel, where acts are treated as functionsmapping from (act-
independent) states to consequences, but not directly as the subjects of uncertainty.
Perhaps, part of the difficulties in incorporating the concept of all-inclusive
states in a game-theoretic model is originated from an unquantified reading of
Bayesianism. “According to the Bayesian view, subjective probabilities should be
assignable to every prospect, including that of players choosing certain strategies in
certain games” (Aumann (1987) p.2, my emphasis). Here, it is not entirely clear as
to which subjective Bayesian theory is under consideration, yet it had been made
explicit that each player is assumed to “conform to the Savage theory.” However,
as we have discussed a few lines above, any assignment of the players’ subjective
probabilities to their own acts/strategies actually falls outside the scope of the de-
cision model put forward by Savage.
Yet even if we grant a more general reading on Bayesianism in the respect that
subjective probabilities are manifested in their betting interpretation it will soon
be clear that no non-trivial probabilities can be assigned to one’s own future acts.
To see this, suppose that Jones is faced with choices of either going to an Italian
restaurant or to a French restaurant for dinner. In an attempt to elicit his subjective
probabilities assigned on the two possible future actions, Jones is offered a bet with
payoffs as follows
i: win X if Jones goes to an Italian restaurant,
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ii: nothing if Jones goes to a French restaurant.
(here it is assumed that the monetary reward of X is not too significant to take
effect on Jones’ choice of restaurant yet it is not too small to be easily ignored by
Jones either). Now, suppose that Jones’ subjective probability for his going to an
Italian restaurant is p, then he shall be willing to pay a fee of pX to accept the bet
in exchange of a reward of X on the event that he indeed is having Italian food for
dinner. So far the example accords well with the standard betting interpretation
of subjective probabilities, but story will soon turn once we notice that Jones’ will-
ingness to accept the bet of his going to an Italian restaurant at a cost of pX > 0
implies that he will be going to an Italian restaurant for sure! For, otherwise, it
would be extremely unwise for Jones to knowingly pay a fee of pX but actually go
to a French restaurant while gaining nothing from the bet he paid for, which can
easily be avoided by simply rejecting the bet. And this is true for any 0 < p ≤ 1.
Further, if p = 0 then Jones will be going to a French restaurant for sure. It follows
that the betting rate upon which Jones is willing to pay a fair price for his acts
collapses into 1 or 0.11 In another word, personal probabilities tend to be “gappy”
when it comes to the agents’ own actions.
On a further note, it would not be very constructive for us to just bite the bullet
and admit that probabilities can only be employed in a “take it or leave it” fashion
when it comes to self-actions, while continuing to treat P i as a set of priors of
player i, especially when there is an inserted assumption of P i being commonly
shared among all players (common priors). For it is plain that the latter renders
that there is no prior that is not trivial.
5.3. Adilemma. The distinction between global and local probability assessments
can also be characterized in terms of the asymmetry of different viewpoints, a re-
curring issue in the foundations of game theory. That is, in laying out different
parameters of a game-theoretic model, some aspects of the model are prescribed
from the stance of an external observer (theorist’s third-person perspective) and
some are characteristic of the players being modeled (player’s first-person view-
point). The mismatch between these different levels of viewpoint is the source of
many mind-boggling puzzles in game theory. The often asked question is why a
first-person viewpoint cannot be leveled with that of a third-person? Or, in an-
other word, how is it that the players themselves cannot be the theorist? As a mat-
ter of fact, many important results presuppose a convergence of the two epistemic
perspectives. However, the discussion we made above gives a not-all-favorable
answer to these questions, it points out that within the Bayesian framework how
the gap created by the asymmetry of different viewpoints cannot be filled.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ω,ω′ ∈ Ω, then, by viability, I(ω) and I(ω′) are non-
empty. If I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) = ∅ then we are done. Otherwise, let ν′ ∈ I(ω) ∩ I(ω′)
and ν ∈ I(ω), from the former we get ν′ ∈ I(ω) and hence I(ν′) ⊆ I(ω′) by
inclusion. Then ν ∈ I(ω) and ν′ ∈ I(ω) implies ν ∈ I(ν′) via mutuality, hence
ν ∈ I(ω′). This is shows that I(ω) ⊆ I(ω′). Similarly, I(ω′) ⊆ I(ω). Together,
we have I(ω) = I(ω′). 
11See Spohn (1977) p.115 and Levi (1989) p.32 for relevant discussions on this point.
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Proof of Proposition 6. By Definition 2, I i and I j are divisible if and only if they are
viable, inclusive, and mutual.
(1) If ω is a blindspot it is trivially true that ω /∈ I i(ω) by Definition 4 . It
remains to show the “only if” direction. Suppose, for contradiction, that
ω /∈ Bi(Ω), then by definition this implies, there is some ν ∈ Ω for which
ω ∈ I i(ν), from which we get I i(ω) ⊆ I i(ν) via inclusion. On the other
other hand, by viability, I i(ω) is non-empty, then let ω′ ∈ I i(ω), hence
ω′ ∈ I i(ν). From ω ∈ I i(ν) and ω′ ∈ I i(ν) we conclude that ω ∈ I i(ω′)
and ω′ ∈ I i(ω) via mutuality. The latter also implies that I i(ω′) ⊆ I i(ω),
and hence ω ∈ I i(ω), a contradiction. Thus, if I i is divisible, then ω /∈
I i(ω) implies that ω ∈ Bi(Ω).
(2) Suppose, to the contrary, that ν 6∈ I i(ν), then, by (1), ν ∈ Bi(Ω), but this
contradicts the assumption that ν ∈ I i(ω), and hence ν ∈ I i(ν). This
yields ν ∈ I i(ν) ∩ I i(ω), then, by Proposition 3, I i(ν) = I i(ω).
(3) For any ν ∈ I i(Ω), we have ν ∈ I j(Ω). The latter implies that there is
some ω′ ∈ Ω for which ν ∈ I j(ω′). Then, by (2), ν ∈ I j(ν). 
Proof of Proposition 8. (1) and (2) are immediate from the definitions above. To see
(3), note that
I i
(
IN(ω)
)
=
⋃
ν∈IN(ω)
I i(ν). (9)
Now suppose, to the contrary, that there is some δ such that δ ∈
⋃
ν∈IN(ω) I
i(ν)
but δ /∈ IN(ω). From the latter we conclude that δ is not ❀N-accessible from ω;
the former, on the other hand, implies that there is some ν ∈ IN(ω) such that
δ ∈ I i(ν), from which we get that δ can be reached from ω (first to ν via❀N and
then to δ through❀i), and hence is❀N-accessible from ω, a contradiction.
For (4), it is sufficient to show that IN(ω) ⊆ I i(IN(ω)) under the assumption
that I i(Ω) = I j(Ω) for all i, j ∈ N. Let ν ∈ IN(ω), then, by (1), there shall be a
sequence i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ N and a sequence ω0, . . . ,ωk−1,ωk ∈ I
N(ω) with ω0 = ω
and ωk = ν such that ν ∈ I
ik(ωk−1). The latter implies that ν ∈ I
ik(Ω), then, by
Proposition 6(3), ν ∈ I i(ν), and hence ν ∈
⋃
ν∈IN(ω) I
i(ν) in (9). This completes
the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 9. For any i ∈ N, consider the event
Ei =
{
ν ∈ Ω | f
(
I i(ν)
)
= di
}
, di ∈ D (10)
where Ei is the set of possible states in which f yield di given player i’s information
I i(ν) at ν. It is plain that ω ∈ Ei for all i ∈ N. By Definition 7, the assumption that
di’s are common information at ω amounts to
IN(ω) ⊆
⋂
i∈N
Ei. (11)
Then, ν ∈ IN(ω) implies ν ∈ Ei via (11), and hence, by (10),
f
(
I i(ν)
)
= di. (12)
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Note that each I i is assumed to be divisible, this implies, by Lemma 8(4), that, for
each i ∈ N,
IN(ω) =
⋃
ν∈IN(ω)
I i(ν). (13)
Finally, since f is an informational decision function for each i, apply (GSTP) to
(12) and (13), we get f
(
IN(ω)
)
= di. Therefore di = dj for all i, j ∈ N. 
Proof of Theorem 10. By (5), for any ω ∈ Ω, I(ω) ⊆ Ω, hence BΩ = {ω ∈ Ω |
I(ω) ⊆ Ω} = Ω. And, for any ω ∈ Ω, I(ω) ⊆ E ∪ F and I(ω) ⊆ ¬E imply that
I(ω) ⊆ F. Thus, N and K hold for B. 
Proof of Theorem 11. We prove only the first claim, (2) and (3) can be shown simi-
larly. Assume that B satisfiesDwe show that, for any ω ∈ Ω, there is some ω′ such
that ω ❀ ω′, or equivalently, I(ω) 6= ∅. Suppose, to the contrary, that I(ω) = ∅
for some ω ∈ Ω, then we have ω ∈ B∅ 6= ∅. But, in D, let E = ∅, we have
B∅ ⊆ ¬B¬∅ = ¬BΩ = ¬Ω = ∅ via Lemma 10, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that I(ω) 6= ∅ for all ω ∈ Ω, then, for any E, ω ∈ BE
implies ∅ 6= I(ω) ⊆ E, and hence I(ω) * ¬E. Then, by definition, ω /∈ B¬E,
thus ω ∈ ¬B¬E. This shows, BE ⊆ ¬B¬E. 
Proof of Theorem 13. Let
ω = (ai, a−i; ti, t−i),
ω′ = (bi, b−i; si, s−i),
ω′′ = (ci, c−i; ui, u−i).
(1) Suppose that, for ω, there is no ω′ such that ω ❀i ω′, this implies, by (C2),
that, for any b−i ∈ A−i, ti(b−i) = 0, and hence ∑b−i∈A−i t
i(b−i) = 0. But this
contradicts the assumption that ti is probability function on A−i. Thus, for any
ω ∈ Ω, there exists some ω′ such that ω ❀i ω′.
(2) Assume that ω ❀i ω′ and ω′ ❀i ω′′, then, by (C2),
ti(b−i) > 0; and si(c−i) > 0. (14)
We show ti(c−i) > 0, i.e., ω ❀i ω′′. Suppose that this is not the case, then
ti(c−i) = 0, hence, by (C1), there is some ρi ∈ P i for which ti(c−i) = ρi(Jc−iK) =
0. This implies that Jc−iK is a set of blindspots via (B1). On the other hand,
from si(c−i) > 0 we conclude that there is some σi ∈ P i such that si(c−i) =
σi
(
Jc−iK
)
> 0. But if Jc−iK is a set of blindspots then, by (B1), σi
(
Jc−iK
)
= 0, a
contradiction. Hence,❀i is transitive.
(3) Finally, assume that ω ❀i ω′ and ω ❀i ω′′, we show that ω′ ❀i ω′′. The
assumption implies that ti(b−i) > 0 and ti(c−i) > 0, and hence, for some
ρi ∈ P i, ti(c−i) = ρi(Jc−iK) > 0. Now suppose, to the contrary, that ω′ 6❀i
ω′′, that is, si(c−i) = 0. The latter implies, via (C1) and (B1), that Jc−iK is a
set of blindspots, and hence ρi(Jc−iK) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, ❀i is
Euclidean. 
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